Strafford智庫對中國2011年的預測

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美國Strafford民間智庫對中國2011年的預測

Strafford Analysis for 2011-(China)

China is struggling with its own economic imbalances. STRATFOR has long been perceived as bearish on the Chinese economy. We are less bearish than realistic, and the reality is that the longer an economic miracle continues to be miraculous, the more likely it is to end its amazing run. We cannot help but notice the similarities between China and its East Asian economic predecessors: Japan, South Korea and the Southeast Asian “Tigers.” The Chinese have shown great resilience, but the global economic crisis revealed the weaknesses of China’s export-based model. While government investment now makes up the lion’s share of the Chinese economy, Beijing is walking a very difficult path between rampant inflation and rapid economic slowing.

As China’s leaders search for a solution and try to avoid the social consequences of a slip in either direction, they are also focused on the next major generational leadership transition, slated to begin in 2012. This discourages any radical or daring economic policies, and stability will remain the watchword as the politicians jockey for position. But given the status of the Chinese economy, and the continued effects internationally of the global slowdown, daring policies and ideas are perhaps what China needs. While Beijing is likely to procrastinate in making any radical economic policy changes, and thus avoid the likely short-term chaos that could entail, the longer the leaders delay fundamental action, the worse things may be when the system starts to unravel.

Beijing was concerned that rolling back stimulus policies enacted in late 2008 would put economic growth at risk, and with it employment. STRATFOR has learned that, given these circumstances, Beijing has decided to keep that stimulus intact. This will solve the employment problem, but it comes at the certain price of higher inflation. China’s challenge in 2011 will be to maintain sufficient services and subsidies to keep social forces in check at a time when the country’s economic model will exacerbate inflationary problems.

Though growth may slow, STRATFOR does not anticipate it to collapse beneath the government’s target level. This will require a tightrope walk between excessive inflation on one side and drastic slowing on the other. China’s leaders want a smooth transition to the next generation of leaders in 2012, and do not want the economy to collapse on their watch. They will err on the side of higher inflation, which could exacerbate social troubles, but Beijing is betting this will remain manageable.

China’s exports recovered in 2010 from the lows of 2009, but export growth is expected to slow in 2011. Wages, energy and utilities costs are rising; the government is letting the currency slowly appreciate; workers are demanding better conditions and more compensation while the demographic advantage and the amount of new migrant labor entering markets is slowing. All of these processes will continue in 2011 to the detriment of export sector stability. Already some manufacturers of cheap goods are operating at a loss. Reports of loss-making enterprises are not yet widespread, but they indicate the real strains from rising costs that will worsen in 2011. However, as long as the American recovery continues and there are no other big external shocks, the export sector will not collapse.
China’s primary hope for maintaining targeted growth rates is investment. Since 2008, Beijing has relied on government spending packages and, most important, gargantuan helpings of bank loans to drive growth. The central government will continue these stimulus policies in 2011. Meanwhile, Beijing will allow banks to continue high levels of lending, and the banks appear just capable of surging credit for another year. Deposits are still growing and outnumber loans, several major banks raised capital in 2010, and Beijing has toughened regulatory requirements to increase capital adequacy, reserves and bad loan provisions. Nevertheless the credit boom cannot last much longer, and the sector is sitting on a volcano of new non-performing loans worth at least $900 billion. Without credible reform in lending practices, continued high levels of lending in China will increase systemic financial risks as companies take out new loans to roll over bad debt and invest in inefficient or speculative projects, while adding to inflation and compounding the sector’s future burdens. Though a banking crisis may be averted in 2011, it cannot be averted for long.

With Beijing willing to use government investment and bank lending to avoid a deep slowdown, inflation will rise and cause economic and socio-political problems in 2011, generating outbursts of social discontent along the lines of previous inflationary periods, such as 2007-2008, or even, conceivably, 1989. Inflation is hitting all the essential commodities, and STRATFOR sources perceive unusually high levels of social frustration from Beijing to Hong Kong. The government will use social policies, price controls and subsidies to alleviate the problem, but will not be able to prevent major incidents of unrest. Security forces are capable of dealing with protests and riots, but such incidents will reveal the depth of the problems the country faces.


Internationally, China will continue playing a more assertive role. Beijing will accelerate its foreign resource acquisition and outward investment strategy. It will continue pursuing large infrastructure projects in border areas and in peripheral countries despite resulting tensions with India and Southeast Asian states. It will increase maritime patrols in its neighboring seas and maintain a hard-line position on territorial and sovereignty disputes, increasing the risk of clashes with Japan, Vietnam, South Korea and others. China’s military modernization will continue to focus on areas like anti-access and area denial and cyber capabilities, and the lack of transparency will continue to feed foreign suspicions. China’s trade disputes with other nations — especially the United States — will worsen, though Beijing will make token policy changes and increase imports to reduce political friction. The United States will make bigger threats of imposing concrete trade measures against China as the year progresses, taking at least symbolic action, perhaps toward the end of the year as the 2012 election campaign starts to warm up.

美國Strafford民間智庫對中國2011年的預測

中國仍設法調整它的經濟不平衡。外界一直批評Strafford對中國的經濟前景較悲觀，我們不是悲觀而是面對事實。而現實是：中國的經濟「奇蹟」越是持久，最終強烈爆破的機會就越大。我們察覺到中國與其它東亞鄰邦如日本、韓國及東南亞國家實質上沒有分別。中國的堅韌力很出色，不過全球性的經濟危機亦暴露了它以出口為主經濟體系的弱點。現在政府直接投放已成了中國經濟主要構成的部份，北京將被迫在通脹失控與經濟急劇冷卻之中走一條辛苦的窄路。

而在避免社會不穩定搜索出路之中，中國政府亦要為2012的交班作出安排。在新人事暗地裡的角力與新舊班子權力交接中，「穩定」會是主調，這會使任何大刀闊斧的改革變成不切實際。可是，從中國經濟現狀與全球經濟持績下滑的情況下，中國是必需要有更大的調整，拖延只是減少短暫的痛苦，一旦到了不得不更改時，相對所付出的代價就越大。

北京擔心如果中止2008年時的大規模經濟刺激政策，就會導致經濟增長放緩，進而影響就業。Strafford得到的訊息是：北京已決定保留原有經濟刺激政策。這樣可以紓緩就業問題，卻導致更高的通脹。在2011年中國的挑戰將是維持足夠的社會福利與補貼以免社會泛起不滿，好讓國家的經濟模式能騰出雙手去處理高度通脹的難關。

雖然增長會放緩，我們認為它不會崩塌而低於原定預設目標之下。經濟將在高通脹與與急劇放緩中走鋼線，因為中國政府不會希望在本屇後段時間經濟崩潰。兩害之間，寧可冒高通脹的風險，雖然社會衝突可能因此加劇，北京方面相信自己有應對的能力。

中國的出口已從2009年的低谷反彈，但2011的出口前景仍是較黯淡的。工資、能源價格及提供公共設施的成本都上升，中國會容許人民幣有限度的升值；工人要求加工資及改善工作環境的壓力漸漸增強，而人口紅利正在放緩。 這些都是2011出口的不利因素。現在一些工廠已在虧蝕，但情況仍不算普遍，在2011年這情況將更形惡化。不過，隨著美國市場的穩步復甦，只要沒有其它意想不到的意外發生，中國出口在來年沒有全面崩潰的危險。

為了要保持增長，中國最大的希望將放在投放方面。自2008年，北京一直依賴政府開銷維持，更重要的是大力支持銀行以貸款形式去推動經濟。中央政府在2011年將繼續這樣的經濟刺激政策。同一時間，北京將容許銀行維持高水平的貸款，因此，銀行在未來一年將又可以大幅放款。 存款額依然在上升，而且比放款額上升速度快。在2010年北京多次提高了銀行準備金額及增加了呆壞帳撥備，可是，這放款膨脹期不可能維持太久。整個銀行體制就如同坐在9,000億的不良貸款火山口上。如果不及時作出有效改革，貸款的企業將會以新貸償舊貸的形式存在並把貸款投機在沒有高效的項目上。這只會增大整個制度的風險。 2011年應不會看到中國銀行危機，可是，這樣的情況不可能拖得太久。
   
北京既然願意以政府投放與銀行放款來避免經濟嚴重的放緩，那麼通脹與社會問題將一再發生。這是與2007-2008，甚至與1989時通脹高企而引發的社會問題如出一轍。通脹已影響到所有的基本生活品，Strafford可以察覺到由北京乃至香港民間不滿的情緒。政府會以社會福利政策，價格管制以及補助來稍微紆解問題，但不可能完全排除突發事件，而這些突發事件將揭示相關問題真實嚴重的程度。

在國際上，中國政府會更趨強硬，北京會加快境外資源收購與對外投資策略。它將會在周邊國家進行重大項目，即使它與這些周邊國家存在領土分歧及緊張。它將加強海上行動而增大了與日本、越南、韓國及其它國家衝突的機會。中國軍方亦會在反進入，抗拒及網路戰爭中加強關注，而因欠缺透明度，導致外國的猜疑。貿易(特別是中美貿易)磨擦將加劇。中國亦會在一些地方作象徵性政策的改變及增加進口以減輕政治上的磨擦。美國因2012大選年的迫近，加大對中國貿易戰的力度，